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Introduction
On labor markets employers commonly pay wages above market-clearing prices. The reason is that workers reciprocate this by exerting positive effort (Akerlof and Yellen 1990) . This so-called "gift-exchange" relationship is frequently confirmed by experimental evidence (e.g., Fehr et al. 1993; Fehr et al. 1998) . 1 However, it is likely that labor market interventions may impair the positive relation between wages and effort. For instance, agreed wages or minimum wages may exacerbate the signaling of fairness (Brandts and Charness 2004) . In this cases, minimum wages often become reference points, i.e., employees may start to compare the wage payments of the employers to the minimum wage (Falk et al. 2006) . As a consequence, employers often have to overbid minimum wages when trying to signal kind behavior.
Reciprocity may not only be triggered by sufficiently high wages. A common view is that worker motivation is positively affected when worker interests are represented towards their employers, i.e., when workers receive "voice" in their companies. This can be acquired in labor unions or works councils. These institutions provide workers a platform to negotiate wages and working conditions. While wages frequently rise when unions are active (Menezes-Filho 1997; Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen 2003) , institutional voice may also have productivityenhancing effects (Freeman and Medoff 1979, 1984) . Works councils represent institutions with similar characteristics playing an active role in co-determination. The right to speak is realized by "worker participation," a concept where employees are involved in organizational decisionmaking within their companies. Empirical evidence documents that works councils facilitate communication between workers and management leading to increased efficiency. (FitzRoy and Kraft 1987, 2005; Frick 1996) . Hence, understanding the behavioral effects of "voice" may be promising to maintain reciprocity when labor-market policies impair gift exchange.
In this paper we experimentally test the role of worker participation for one of these cases, namely a minimum remuneration policy. We focus on a stylized experiment where employers decide on the remuneration of three workers who do a real-effort task. We study worker participation and the role of voice effects by varying the way how a minimum remuneration policy is introduced (endogenously vs. exogenously). In our main treatment workers bargain with the employer on the introduction of a minimum remuneration requirement. In the control treatment, the minimum remuneration policy is exogenously introduced. We do not intend to model the actual practice and functioning of labor unions and works councils. Instead, our focus lies on the analysis of the behavioral effects of obtaining voice on employees' reciprocity. Following Freeman and Medoff (1979, 1984) and the empirical evidence on works councils, we hypothesize that this form of worker participation will stabilize reciprocity when employers have to pay a minimum remuneration. We expect that workers exert higher effort after they actively enforced this policy through collective bargaining actions with their employer.
The results show meaningful support for our hypothesis. First, we find that effort generally increases under a minimum remuneration requirement. Second, the increase is more pronounced when the requirement was enforced by the employees. In this treatment where employees are warranted worker participation, effort increases by 12% after the minimum remuneration policy was enforced. By contrast, when the policy was exogenously introduced, effort only increases by 5%. The majority of workers (77%) increases productivity after they enforced the policy.
Whereas, only 55% of the workers do so in the exogenous case. Interestingly, paying a high compensation to trigger effort becomes less important after the policy was enforced. Instead, employees even exert high effort under low compensation. In the absence of worker participation, employers overbid exogenous minimum remuneration requirements to trigger effort. Our findings suggest that warranting worker participation may be a promising tool to maintain reciprocity.
The idea that reciprocity may be reinforced by worker participation builds on Charness et al. (2012) . Our study is most related to their paper which reports that "hidden advantages in delegation" exist in a gift-exchange setting. 2 Charness et al. (2012) modify the gift-exchange setup allowing principals to delegate the wage choice to the employees. Their major finding is that worker participation increases reciprocity leading to higher effort when employees have the right to set their wages. Jeworrek and Mertins (2014) confirm these findings in the field. The efficiency-enhancing effect of voice has also been shown in further labor-market experiments. Corgnet and Hernán González (2013) report in a principal-agent setting that agents increase their productivity when their demand is met by the principal. Mellizo et al. (2014) report a performance increase in a real-effort experiment when subjects vote on the payment scheme. 3
In contrast to the aforementioned studies, we study the effectiveness of worker participation when a minimum remuneration policy is introduced. Our experiment tests whether worker participation may preserve effort when reciprocity is exacerbated by labor-market policies. In (2012b) focus on voting decisions among employees participating in a union without employers.
They find that productive workers ignore the employment of low productivity workers. 4 By contrast, we focus on the effects of bargaining between both, employees and employers.
In a wider context, other experiments analyze voice effects in settings different from labor markets. For instance, in ultimatum games it is found that voice increases the acceptance of proposals when proposers can send messages (Andersson et al. 2010) or responders can state requests (Ong et al. 2012) . Kleine et al. (2014) report that dictator giving is higher when dictators may state their concerns. The idea that worker participation increases the commitment to policies is also motivated by the findings of endogenous institutions. These papers highlight that cooperation increases in public-good games (Kosfeld et al. 2009; Sutter et al. 2010; Markussen et al. 2014) , and prisoner's dilemmas (Dal Bó et al. 2010) when subjects participate in the organization of institutions. Babcock et al. (2015) even find evidence in a field experiment that choosing a treatment substantially improves performance over being assigned to a treatment.
Another related strand of literature concerns experiments on minimum wages. Brandts and Charness (2004) find that minimum wages impair reciprocity in a gift-exchange setting.
Employers face difficulties to signal kindness under minimum wages which leads to an effort decrease. Owens and Kagel (2010) find in a gift-exchange game that minimum wages lead to 2 Falk and Kosfeld (2006) highlight in another paper that "hidden costs of control" may also play an important role in principal-agent settings. Put differently, revoking the freedom of employees may backfire, i.e., employees exert lower effort when principals specify minimum effort levels. 3 In their experiment they do not model employers. 4 Gose and Sadrieh (2014) focus on a modified gift-exchange game with multiple employees. Workers in this setup are given collective action, i.e., they may reject employers' uniform wage offers.
significantly higher wages. However, effort only moderately increases. Other studies abstract from effort choices and highlight that minimum wages may work as reference points. Falk (2006) show that minimum wages increase employees' reservation wages and thus lead to higher wage payments. In contrast to our setting these studies do not focus on the impact of worker participation on performance. The only exception is Dittrich et al. (2011) , which however, abstracts from effort choices. Their main focus is the setting of wages when workers have bargaining power. 5 The paper extends the setting of Falk et al. (2006) showing that wage payments significantly increase in minimum wages.
Our experiment combines several features of the aforementioned approaches. First, it builds on the evidence that worker participation and endogenous institutions may increase efficiency (Charness et al. 2012; Sutter et al. 2010) . Second, it tests whether this may balance out the detrimental effects of minimum wages on reciprocity (Brandts and Charness 2004) . Put together, we analyze the role of worker participation to reinforce reciprocity under a minimum remuneration policy
Experimental Design and Procedures
Our framework is a two-stage game where a principal (employer) is matched with three agents (employees, or workers). We apply a fixed-matching design with fixed roles which is repeated for 8 periods. Each period consists of a payoff-distribution stage and a working stage. First, we introduce the timing of the game. Afterwards, we present the treatments.
Timing
Stage 1: Payoff-Distribution
The first stage is a dictator game (Forsythe et al. 1994) . The employer decides on the percental distribution of the firm revenue between her and the three workers. Afterwards workers receive information on the split dictated by the employer. 6 The split can be chosen between 0% and 100% in increments of 10 percentage points. We apply this choice set to simplify the procedure.
The fraction allocated to the employees is equally distributed between them. For instance, if the employer allocates 40% of the revenue to herself and 60% to the employees, each employee receives exactly 20% of the generated revenue. Splits which are not divisible by three are rounded to the first decimal place. For example, if an employer allocates 50% to the employees, each worker receives 50%/3 = 16.66% ≈ 16.7%. We apply equal remuneration payments to the three workers as we intend to avoid horizontal fairness concerns. This is motivated by the findings of Kocher et al. (2012a) . The paper reports that workers in multi-employee gift exchange settings exert higher effort when wage discrimination is not possible.
5
The wage determination follows an alternating-offers bargaining game similar to Rubinstein (1982) 6 The revenue is generated by the workers in the following working stage. The remuneration mechanism implies that workers can increase profits by exerting more effort. We opted for this approach, because it minimizes the cases where employees exert no effort. Note that this commonly occurs in standard gift-exchange games (Fehr et al., 1993; 1998) . Shirking in our setup results in a payoff of zero if no employee exerts effort. We are aware that free-riding incentives still exist. An employee may exert no effort and speculate that at least one employee exerts effort. Our incentive mechanism resembles a revenue-sharing scheme which aims to motivate cooperation (e.g., Weitzman 1985, FitzRoy and Kraft 1986) .
Stage 2: Working Stage
After employers have decided on a distribution of revenues, workers are informed about the allocated share and they have the possibility to generate the firm revenue by performing a realeffort task (Benndorf et al. 2014) . The task corresponds to an encryption task where letters have to be encoded to numbers (see the appendix).
In each of the 8 periods workers are given five minutes to perform the task. In the meantime, employers have the possibility to surf the internet. The firm payoff (revenue) increases by e0.10
for each correctly solved puzzle. During the 5-minute time period employees may also make use of an outside option (surf the internet). On-the-job leisure activities constitute an important part of the work place and may help to attenuate participation in experiments (Lei et al. 2001) .
Real-effort tasks may become focal in experiments when no alternatives are present. Thus, adding a desirable outside option sets up trade offs between work effort and leisure (Corgnet et al. 2014) . In our experiment workers can always decide on the allocation of the time (0-5 minutes) they want to spend on exerting effort or surfing the internet. While surfing the internet, workers cannot perform the task. However, surfing the internet still yields a payoff of e0.01
for each ten seconds spent on the internet. Paying subjects for using the outside option has been successfully applied in experimental economics (see Mohnen et al. 2008) , as it ensures that subjects have significant opportunity cost when working on the real-effort task. The outside payoff is not shared with the other members of a firm. Workers can switch between the task and the outside option any number of times.
After five minutes, a period is finished and all members of a firm are informed on the total number of correctly solved tasks. Neither the employer nor the workers learn how many puzzles were solved by any individual worker. Employer and employees are also informed on the total firm revenue, the employer's profit, and the resulting individual worker profits. The payoff each worker receives from using the outside option is not communicated to the employer or the fellow employees.
The employer's profit in period t (π e,t ) is calculated as follows: ; 10; 20; 30; 40; 50; 60; 70; 80; 90; 100}, and t ∈ {1, ..., 8}, and i = 1, 2, 3.
(1)
A refers to the remuneration for each correctly solved problem. We set A = e0.10. i x i,t is the total number of correctly solved tasks of all three employees in period t where x i,t is the number of correctly solved tasks of worker i ∈ {1, 2, 3} in the current period t. The expression A · i x i,t represents the corporate profit of the firm. The expression (100 − s t ) is the share of the joint revenue kept by the employer. Finally, s t represents the current share of revenue which the employer allocates to the workers in period t.
An individual worker i's payoff in period t (π w i ,t ) corresponds to the share of revenue she receives plus the amount of money she has generated in the working stage by using the outside option (π o i ,t ):
Treatments
We apply a within-subjects design with eight periods. The setting consists of two parts with four periods each. Before the experiment begins, subjects are provided with the instructions explaining the first part of the experiment (periods 1-4). Subjects also know that a second part will follow but they do not have information on the procedures of the second part. Furthermore, subjects are informed that they will receive new instructions after part one is finished. In periods 1-4, they take part in the payoff-distribution and working stages as described above.
In periods 5-8, we apply two different treatments which correspond to institutional changes (Fehr and Gächter 2000) . We follow the literature on endogenous institutions (e.g., Kosfeld et al. 2009; Sutter et al. 2010) where subjects have voting rights on the implementation of institutions. These papers compare treatments with voting settings to environments where institutions are introduced exogenously. In our case, we study the effects of the endogenous vs. exogenous introduction of minimum remuneration policies on performance. In our main treatment employees take part in a bargaining process on the implementation of a minimumremuneration institution. In the control treatment the institution is exogenously introduced.
Endogenous Minimum Share of Revenue (MSR)
Our main treatment studies the impact of worker participation on the efficiency of a minimum remuneration requirement. In the treatment, workers participate in a onetime bargaining process with their employer over the introduction of such a minimum remuneration requirement. When a requirement was successfully enforced, the employer is required to pay a minimum share of revenue (henceforth MSR) in the subsequent periods. We call this treatment: endogenous
Minimum Share of Revenue (MSR).
The treatment works as follows: After workers have completed the first part of the experiment, they receive new instructions and are informed on the bargaining stage. This stage only occurs before period 5 begins. Here, the three employees jointly bargain with the employer over the level of an MSR. The bargaining process is similar to the framework of the reverse ultimatum game introduced by Gneezy et al. (2003) . 7 The following procedural rules apply:
First of all, workers need to agree on an MSR level they want to request from the employer.
To reach an agreement, the three employees individually and simultaneously decide on a request level (r i ) between zero and 100 in increments of 10 percentage points. It follows that: ; 10; 20; 30; 40; 50; 60; 70; 80; 90; 100} . To this end they are presented a grid with three rows encompassing request levels between 0% and 100%. Each row corresponds to the choice set of one of the three workers. The grid is depicted below. It presents workers' MSR-choice set et al. (2003) , the proposer makes an offer to the responder who can accept or reject. Following a rejection, the proposer has to make another offer. The main difference in our experiment is that the workers submit the offer (the request) and the employer decides whether to accept or to reject the request. Further differences are that subjects bargain over a percental split of a firm revenue and we are not interested in the impact of a time restriction on the bargaining process.
in the bargaining stage. Each employee is allocated a unique name (employee 1, 2, and 3). The workers are informed on their names and have to enter the desired MSR level.
Chosen minimum wage 8 by the employees:
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% employee 1 X employee 2 employee 3 X You are employee 2. Please enter your minimum-wage request: 60
In the given example, employees 1 and 3 have already entered a request level of 60% and employee 2 is currently entering a request level of 60%. Employees cannot change their selection after they have decided. To determine workers' joint MSR request, an unanimity rule is applied. If at least one of the three workers selects a request level different from the others, no agreement is reached. In this case, all entries are deleted and the choice process restarts. In total, the workers are given 90 seconds to reach an agreement. If they fail, a majority rule selects the choice of the MSR request which was chosen most often. In case of a tie, a random draw selects one of these requests. This case never occurred in our experiments. Once an agreement is reached, the chosen MSR request is sent to the employer.
The employer observes it and has to decide whether she accepts or rejects the request. If the employer accepts workers' claim, the bargaining stage ends. In this case the accepted request level will be implemented as MSR for periods 5-8. However, if the request is rejected, the employees are informed and have to send a new request. In what follows, new request levels will be determined with the same procedure as described above. However, from now on the requests have to be below the rejected request (see Gneezy et al. 2003) . In this case, agents are presented a new computer screen with a shortened grid of possible request levels between 0 and r rej − 10, with r rej being the previously rejected MSR request level. The bargaining process is repeated as long as both parties have not reached an agreement. It also ends when employers reject a request level of 10%, or when employees request a level of zero. In these cases, no MSR is introduced.
When an MSR was enforced, the employer has to allocate at least this percentage to the agents in each of the following periods, but she is free to allocate more. The MSR can be of any 
Exogenous Minimum Share of Revenue (MSR)
Our control treatment aims to disentangle the effect of worker participation on the efficiency of a minimum remuneration requirement. The situation in periods 1-4 is exactly the same as described before.
A crucial difference is, that the MSR is not enforced by the workers. Instead, we exogenously introduce it after the end of period 4. Before period 5 starts, all subjects are informed on the exact level of the MSR which is introduced. In the control treatment, we only focus on MSR levels which were enforced by the workers in endogenous MSR. In periods 5-8, employers are required to allocate a share of revenue which is as least as high as the MSR.
Procedures
Subjects in both treatments receive written instructions before the beginning of period 1. They learn that the experiment consists of two parts and the second part is going to start after period 4, but they do not receive information about the content (and length) of the second part. After subjects have processed periods 1-4, they receive a new set of instructions. In endogenous MSR subjects are informed about the bargaining stage and that an MSR may be enforced. By contrast, in the control treatment workers and employers are informed that the MSR is exogenously introduced. All treatments were programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). In total, 144 subjects participated in the experiment, i.e., we had 64 subjects in endogenous MSR and 80 subjects in exogenous MSR. Subjects were from various fields and were recruited with ORSEE (Greiner 2004 
Hypotheses
In this section we outline our hypotheses. We start with the worker remuneration before and after the introduction of an MSR. In a next step, we focus on the impact of endogenous/exogenous MSRs on worker effort. are not only forced to pay a higher remuneration, they also anticipate that employees expect a higher compensation. Thus, remuneration payments will significantly increase in periods 5-8 of both treatments.
Hypothesis 1:
(a) Employers increase the allocated share of revenue under an endogenous MSR.
(b) Employers increase the allocated share of revenue under an exogenous MSR.
When employers increase the remuneration of workers exerting effort becomes more profitable.
As a consequence, workers should increase their performances in periods 5-8 of both treatments.
Hypothesis 2:
(a) Workers increase their effort after the introduction of an endogenous MSR.
(b) Workers increase their effort after the introduction of an exogenous MSR.
Experiments have shown that workers may perceive minimum wages as reference points (Falk et al. 2006; Brandts and Charness 2004) . There is evidence that reciprocity may be mitigated when a minimum wage is exogenously introduced (Brandts and Charness 2004) . At the same time, the literature on worker participation emphasizes that the right to speak may significantly increase performance (Corgnet and Hernán González 2013; Mellizo et al. 2014) . Similar evidence is reported by the literature on endogenous institutions, which finds that voting enhances subjects' commitment to policies (e.g., Kosfeld et al. 2009 ). Additional support is given by the responsibility-alleviation effect which predicts that agents bearing the responsibility for an outcome behave more pro-socially (Charness 2000) . Moreover, delegating wage choices to workers may substantially increase their performances (Charness et al. 2012; Jeworrek and Mertins 2014) . Thus, we expect that the signaling of kind behavior is exacerbated under exogenous minimum remuneration requirements. We anticipate that reciprocity may be maintained when employers accept the enforcement of MSRs. As a consequence, we hypothesize that endogenous
MSRs are more effective, leading to a more pronounce performance increase.
Hypothesis 3:
The effort increase will be more pronounced after the introduction of an endogenous MSR as compared to the exogenous case.
Results
In this section we present our results. First, the analysis focuses on the remuneration of the workers. Second, we report our main findings of the impact of worker participation on the success of minimum remuneration policies. Afterwards, we study work incentives and reciprocity. When using non-parametric tests, we always report two-sided p − values. MSRs stimulates exerted effort in both treatments. Noteworthy, the mean performance is higher in the bargaining treatment (21.5) than in the exogenous treatment (20.1). In part two, we find that the increases of remuneration and effort yield higher payoffs for employees, independently of the treatment. A conspicuous finding is that employers' profit is clearly higher under endogenous MSRs (e9.3) as compared to the exogenous case (e7.6).
Worker Remuneration
We start our analysis by focusing on the outcome of the bargaining stage. Table 2 overviews the number of different MSR levels which were enforced in the endogenous treatment. It also depicts the number of the MSR levels we exogenously introduced. To increase power we additionally included observations from a session on exogenous MSRs which we ran before we collected the endogenous data. 9 Remarkably, all firms managed to enforce an MSR of 40% or higher in the endogenous treatment.
In most cases MSRs of 60% or 70% were established. By contrast, low MSRs of 40% and 50%
were only rarely observed. A closer look at the data reveals that employers on average reject two MSR requests before they accept employees claims. Focusing on exogenous MSRs, model 3 emphasizes that MSR present is highly significant with a positive sign. We therefore confirm Hypothesis 1b. Moreover, model 4 once again reveals that higher levels of the MSR yield a significant higher remuneration. We find that female employer is insignificant. Interestingly, period is highly significant and the coefficient is positive. Thus, employers generally increase the remuneration payments over time.
Remarkably, exogenous MSRs apparently lead to a more pronounced increase of the allocated share of revenue. The exogenous case (model 3) reveals that the coefficient of MSR present is almost twice as high (13.500) as compared to endogenous MSRs (6.875; see model 1). A similar pattern occurs when focusing on the MSR levels. Here, regression 4 finds that the level of exogenous MSRs has a more pronounced impact in contrast to the endogenous case.
The coefficient of the exogenous MSR level is more than twice as high (0.716) compared to endogenous MSR levels (0.354; see regression 2). Employers paying a higher compensation in the exogenous treatment could be a first indication that gift-exchange may become exacerbated under minimum remuneration requirements.
Result 1:
(a) The revenue share allocated to workers increases under endogenous and exogenous MSRs.
(b) The increase is clearly more pronounced when the MSR was exogenously introduced.
Worker Performance
Our data reveals that the different levels of MSRs have no diverse effects on workers' performance in both treatments. The Spearman's rank correlation coefficients between the level of MSR and effort are insignificant, indicating no correlation between the MSRs and workers' performance In the absence of an MSR (periods 1-4), we observe an average performance of 19.22. We find that workers' effort significantly increases to 21.54 (periods 5-8) after they enforced an In the treatment with worker participation, we find that the vast majority of workers (77.1%) enhances the performance after the enforcement of MSRs. This holds only for 55% of the workers in exogenous MSR. A χ 2 -test emphasizes that significantly more employees increase their effort in endogenous MSR (χ 2 (1) = 5.703, p = 0.017). Summarizing, our findings demonstrate that MSRs only significantly increase performance when employees have worker participation.
Moreover, a significantly higher fraction of workers increases effort in the treatment where MSRs were enforced. Hence, our data support Hypothesis 3.
Result 2:
(a) Workers significantly increase their performance after the enforcement of an MSR.
(b) Endogenous MSR are more effective than exogenous MSRs.
The results highlight that MSRs are particularly effective when enforced by employees. Hence, we confirm the positive effect of worker participation on performance (Charness et al. 2012; Jeworrek and Mertins 2014) . The data is also in line with the literature on endogenous institutions (e.g., Kosfeld et al., 2009; Sutter et al., 2010 ) and the responsibility-alleviation effect (Charness 2000) . Thus, the results extend these findings and emphasize that worker participation may reinforce reciprocity under minimum remuneration policies.
Work Incentives and Reciprocity
In this section we analyze the drivers of the previous results in more detail. More specifically, we investigate whether the acceptance of wage requests stimulated the maintenance of reciprocity in the treatment with worker participation. Therefore, the analysis focuses on the exerted effort conditioned on the allocated share of revenue under endogenous/exogenous MSRs. Figure 4 depicts this relation. 10 It can be seen that under exogenous MSRs (grey line) workers' average effort is sharply increasing in the level of the allocated share of revenue. Thus, remuneration payments obviously work as signaling device. This supports the importance of remuneration payments as an "instrument" to trigger performance under exogenous MSRs. By contrast, the curve is much flatter under endogenous MSRs (black line). The finding that employees constantly exert high effort, emphasizes that worker motivation and reciprocity is high after they enforced an MSR.
Interestingly, workers exert high effort even when the remuneration is low. Hence, paying high remuneration to motivate workers obviously becomes less important under endogenous MSRs.
By contrast, the presence of low exogenous MSRs triggers low effort when employers pay a remuneration similar to the MSRs (see the remunerations of 40%-50%). In these cases employees obviously show negative reciprocity. Thus, it is interesting to analyze, whether employers under exogenous MSRs anticipate that increasing the remuneration payments is of importance to maintain reciprocity.
To account for this we focus on the cases, where employers overbid the minimum remuneration requirements. These data are presented in We run random-effects panel regressions on the relation between the allocated share of revenue and exerted effort under MSRs. Table 4 presents two models which focus on the data after the introduction of endogenous/exogenous MSRs. The dependent variable is the effort exerted by individual workers. Both regression models control for the allocated share of revenue which is the percentage of the firm revenue offered to an individual worker. We also include control variables: female worker, a dummy variable which is positive for female workers, whereas period Figure 3 , i.e., paying high remuneration to motivate workers is of less importance under endogenous MSRs. Hence, workers are less sensitive to remuneration payments after the enforcement of minimum remuneration requirements. We do not find evidence for learning, i.e., period is insginficant in both models.
To quantify the effect of worker reciprocity, we calculate the ratio of exerted effort per allocated share of revenue (epsr ). We define: epsr = exerted effort/allocated share of revenue.
The epsr is derived by applying the share of revenue which is allocated to an individual worker.
In the absence of an MSR, we find that workers' average epsr is 1.11. The exogenous introduction of an MSR leads to a significant decrease to 0.89 (Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs test, p = 0.007). This demonstrates once more that the introduction of exogenous MSRs comes at the cost of decreased reciprocity. By contrast, the epsr does not significantly change (1.05) after the endogenous introduction of an MSR (Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs test, p = 0.836). Thus, the results emphasize that workers' willingness to exert effort is not mitigated under endogenous
MSRs. This may explain why workers' performance is higher under worker participation where they could enforce an MSR.
Result 3:
Workers' performance becomes less responsive to remuneration payments after they enforced an MSR.
Payoffs
The performance section has revealed that productivity increases more pronounced under endogenous MSRs. However, employers pay higher wages when MSRs were exogenously intro-duced. Hence, it will be interesting to investigate whether employers in turn achieve higher payoffs when employees are granted worker participation.
In the absence of MSRs workers achieve an average payoff of e4.6. suggests that enforced MSRs may also have less detrimental effects for employers. The reason is that employees behave reciprocal when employers accepted their minimum remuneration request.
As a consequence, workers even exert high effort when employers do not overbid the minimum wage requirement.
Conclusion
We investigated the role of worker participation for the efficiency of minimum remuneration requirements. A special focus was the analysis whether participating in collective bargaining reinforces reciprocity under minimum remuneration requirements. Although MSRs generally increase effort, they are particularly efficient when workers enforce them. This supports the findings on the positive effects of worker participation in the lab (Charness et al. 2012; Corgnet and Hernán González 2013) and the field (Jeworrek and Mertins 2014) . Our paper adds to these findings, as it highlights that labor market policies may be more successful when achieved by collective bargaining.
So far, the literature demonstrated that the introduction of minimum wages may come at the cost of reduced effort. The reason is that reciprocity becomes impaired in the presence of minimum wages. That is, minimum wages may complicate the gift-exchange relationship, i.e., the payment of sufficiently high wages to signal kind behavior (Brandts and Charness 2004) . As a consequence, employers may have to overbid minimum wages maintaining worker reciprocity
Our results demonstrate that worker participation is an "instrument" which may substitute the payment of wage premiums after the introduction of minimum wage requirements. The findings in the bargaining treatment show that performance less strongly depends on the remuneration payments by the employers after workers enforced an MSR. In this case workers generally exert higher effort, even if employers do not clearly increase remuneration payments above the required minimum level. This suggests that employers' acceptance of MSR requests seems to work as a positive signaling device to employees. In return workers exert high effort independently of the remuneration level. This holds although employers on average rejected the first two MSR requests. Obviously, employees care less about the level of the MSR, but rather on the fact that the employer ultimately said "yes". By contrast, under exogenous MSRs there exists a positive and significant relation between compensation levels and the exerted effort of workers. Apparently, the exogenous MSR becomes a reference point for the employees when it was automatically introduced. As a consequence, workers shift their reservation remuneration and expect a higher compensation. Employers realize this and start to overbid the MSR to induce worker motivation from the employees' side. This is in line with the findings of Falk et al. (2006) on the "spillover" effects of minimum wages.
The findings of this paper may have interesting implications for a better understanding of worker participation in the context of labor market institutions. First, although stylized in nature, our bargaining setting may represent workers in an employee organization negotiating with their employer. The results suggest that works councils or labor unions may serve as important inter-mediators. They not only defend employees' rights, but also give institutional voice to workers, which may enhance work motivation. Second, the data provides insights for the analysis of behavioral voice effects in labor unions (Freeman and Medoff 1979, 1984) when labor policies can be enforced. We are aware that we present findings of a lab experiment which does not resemble complex labor institutions such as unions. Nonetheless, we believe that these insights may help to better understand the behavioral patterns of work motivation of union members. Thinking of statutory minimum wages, our results suggest that institutional voice in the form of bargaining power may have promising effects on the efficiency of these policies.
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The Real-Effort Task
In the task of Benndorf et al. (2014) subjects are asked to encode random combinations of three letters into numbers (see Table 4 ). Each letter in the first row "word" has to be encrypted in a three-digit number. The "allocation Table 5 : Example of a problem in the real-effort task.
After all three letters are encoded the workers can press a submit button and are informed whether they correctly solved the puzzle. Subjects are also provided with information on the total number of correctly solved puzzles. The task furthermore mitigates learning behavior of subjects by applying a double-randomization mechanism. Whenever a subject enters a correct solution, the word to be encrypted changes. At the same time, the mapping from letters to numbers and the positions of the letters in the table are randomly rearranged. When subjects enter a wrong answer they are informed by the computer program. Here, the number allocations and the locations of the letters will not be shuffled until subjects make a correct input. After the end of five minutes the real-effort task automatically stops and inputs are not possible anymore.
11 For reasons of space only 15 allocations are presented in the example of Table 1 .
I stru tio s of part o e. Not i te ded for pu li atio I stru tio s: PART
Wel o e to toda 's e peri e t. Please do ot talk to others fro o o . I toda 's e peri e t ou ha e the opportu it to ear o e depe di g o our a d the other parti ipa ts' eha ior. You ill re ei e our re u eratio ash i the e d of the e peri e t. For parti ipati g i the e peri e t ou re ei e a sho -up fee of
Euro
Ge eral pro edure of the e peri e t Toda 's e peri e t o sists of t o parts. Part o prises four rou ds. The e peri e t starts o l after all parti ipa ts read a d u derstood the i stru tio s. The e peri e t stops auto ati all after rou d four a d t h e p a r t i i p a t s r e e i e a e s e t o f i s t r u t i o s f o r p a r t . The e peri e t pro eeds o l after all parti ipa ts read a d u derstood the e set of i stru tio s.
You ill e ra do l assig ed the role of either a e plo er or a e plo ee. You keep this role for the whole e peri e t.
The e plo ers a d e plo ees a t as fir s. O e fir o prises e plo er a d e plo ees. The o positio of fir s is ide ti al for the hole e peri e t. Moreo er, the ide tities of all su je ts of a fir ill e er e re ealed. Ea h parti ipa t lear s her assig ed role i the egi i g of the e peri e t.
Pro edure of the rou ds
Ea h rou d o sists of e a tl three su se ue t stages:
 The e plo er de ides i the first stage,  The three e plo ees a t i stage t o.  Fi all , the e plo er a d the three e plo ees are i for ed o the results.
"u arizi g, ea h rou d o prises the follo i g three stages:
. The e plo er de ides a out the Pa off-distribution et ee her a d the three e plo ees.
. The e plo ees work on stage 2 a d ge erate the fir re e ue. . Infor ation on the earnings.
. stage: Payoff-distri utio
The e plo er de ides a out a per e tage split of the fir re e ue et ee her share E a d the three e plo ees ho the fir re e ue is ge erated ill e e plai ed i ore detail elo . The share hi h the three orkers joi tl re ei e share W ill e split e uall a o g the . If the e plo er hooses a share W hi h is ot di isi le three, it ill e rou ded to the first digit. The share W has to e hose et ee 0% a d 00% i i re e ts of per e tage poi ts. Thus, there are possi le splits a aila le.
Please, see also the follo i g s ree shot: E a ple:
 The e plo er hooses a share W of X% of the fir 's re e ue as re u eratio .  A ordi gl , ea h orker ear s X/ % as i di idual pa e t.  Further ore, the e plo er re ei es share E 00 -X% of the fir 's re e ue.
. stage: Worki g phase
Ea h orker is i for ed o the per e tage split of the re e ue et ee the e plo ees share W a d the e plo er share E . Further ore, all orkers are i for ed o the resulti g i di idual pa e ts share W/ . "u se ue tl , i ea h rou d the e plo ees get i utes to do a real-effort task or to press a free-ti e utto . Pressi g the free-ti e utto ope s a I ter et-E plorer ta a d the e plo ee a use the i ter et. Duri g this ti e she ear s o e depe di g i ho u h ti e she spe t o the i ter et ore o this later . While surfi g i the i ter et a su je t a ot ork o the real-effort task.
Re e ue ge eratio  The e plo ees a i rease the fir re e ue orki g o the real-effort task this task ill e e plai ed i ore detail elo . Ea h orre tl sol ed task adds 0 Ce t to the fir re e ue.
 A orker does ot i rease the fir re e ue as lo g as she has a ti ated the free-ti e utto a d is usi g the i ter et.
 The o erall fir re e ue at the e d of ea h rou d a e defi ed as follo s:
Fir re e ue = [ orre tl sol ed tasks of orker + orre tl sol ed tasks of orker + orre tl sol ed tasks of orker ] 0 Ce t Ear i gs ith a ti ated free-ti e utto :
With a a ti ated free-ti e utto , the e plo ee re ei es a pa e t hi h ill ot e shared ith the other e plo ees a d ith the e plo er. I the e d of a rou d, a e plo ee re ei es this pa e t o top of her ear i gs fro the per e tage split of the fir re e ue.
The re u eratio fro usi g the i ter et is as follo s:
 While ha i g a ti ated the free-ti e utto a d usi g the i ter et, the e plo ee auto ati all re ei es a i di idual pa e t of Ce t for ea h 0 se o ds. This pa e t ill o l e a redited for o pleted ti e i ter als. For e a ple, a ti ati g the free-ti e utto a d usi g the i ter et for se o ds gi es a additio al pa e t ear i gs i ter et of 6 Ce t = 6 Ce t.
 The ear i gs fro usi g the i ter et is defi ed as:
Ear i gs i ter et =
Nu er of o pleted ti e-i ter als "ek.
Ce t E plo er:
Duri g stage , a I ter et-E plorer ta ope s auto ati all for the e plo er. Thus, she a use the i ter et duri g this stage. Ho e er, the e plo er does ot get a additio al pa e t fro usi g the i ter et. The ta loses auto ati all after i utes at the e d of stage .
. stage: I for atio o ear i gs For the real-effort task, words ha e to e e r pted i u ers. Ea h ord o sists of three apital letters ea h of hi h has to e e r pted ith a u er. The e r ptio is gi e a ta le elo the ord to e e r pted. Please, also see the s ree shot elo .
I this e a ple the parti ipa t is urre tl e r pti g ord u er see e tered field: a o e . Here, the three apital letters: O , D a d G ha e to e e oded. The solutio follo s i ediatel fro the ta le:
To ake a i put please li k o the gre o elo the first apital letter.
Further ore, ou ill re ei e the follo i g i for atio :
-"share W is X% of the fir re e ue = allo ated share to the orkers i the orrespo di g period.
You urre tl e r pt ord u er = urre t ord to e r pt.
Re ai i g ti e [se ] = re ai i g ti e i the urre t period.
I porta t hi ts:
 Please ote that after ha i g e tered the three-digit u er ou a easil s it h to the e t gre o usi g the ta ulator key o our ke oard.
I the follo i g pi ture ou a see the positio of the ta ulator ke o our ke oard:
 The i put of the u ers a e perfor ed faster usi g the u pad o the right of our ke oard.
I the follo i g pi ture ou a see the positio of the u pad o our ke oard:
If all u ers ha e ee e tered, please li k the OK  The o puter the he ks hether all apital letters ha e ee e oded orre tl . O l the the ord is ou ted as orre tl sol ed. Thereafter a e ord agai o sisti g of three apital letters is ra do l dra .
 Further ore, a e e r ptio ta le is ra do l ge erated i t o steps:
The o puter progra ra do l sele ts i the ta le a e set of three-digit u ers to e used for the e odi g of the apital letters.
Additio all , the o puter progra shuffles the positio of the apital letters i the ta le.
Please ote that the progra al a s uses all apital letters of the Ger a alpha et.
tabulator key u pad
Please note that if a new word appears, ou ha e to li k with our ouse on the first of the three blue bo es. Otherwise, no input is possible!  The o puter ill ark i red fo t ro g i puts after pressi g the OK utto .
After i utes, the possi ilit to ork o the task stops auto ati all . The , ou a ot e ter a e i put.
. How the free-ti e utto a d the i ter et usage work:
Duri g the orki g phase, the orkers are free to hoose ho u h ti e the spe d for orki g o the realeffort task a d ho u h ti e the a t to spe d for usi g the i ter et.
The ti e of stage ru s fro the egi i g of stage o . There is o ti e-out he usi g the i ter et.
Use of the i ter et for e plo ees :
O the s ree there is utto alled reak/start i ter et . B pushi g this utto the i ter et a ess a e a ti ated. A ti ati g the i ter et pushi g the utto lo ks the i put fields fro the real-effort task a d a I ter et E plorer i do ope s auto ati all .
The Bro ser ope s at full s ree . While the i ter et is a ti ated, a ti er i the a kgrou d re ords the ti e used for surfi g i the i ter et. You ill ear Ce t auto ati all for e er 0 se o ds spe t o the e . This a ou t ill e added to our ear i gs fro the allo ated share W see a o e . "top usi g the i ter et:
After ti e ra out o stage , the auto ati re u eratio fro usi g the i ter et stops. The i do loses auto ati all . Duri g the re ai i g ti e o stage ou a also s it h a k to the real-effort task li ki g the i do -lose utto i the upper right part of the I ter et E plorer i do see pi ture Doi g so redire ts ou to the real-effort task. You a o ti ue the task li ki g the utto o ti ue task . see s ree shot elo Please oti e: -Alter ati el , orkers a also s it h a k to the s ree a o e ith the ke oard o i atio "Alt-TAB -Workers a s it h et ee the task a d the i ter et a u er of ti es. -If ou a t to retur to the i ter et after s it hi g a k to the task, ou eed to li k o the reak/start i ter et utto agai . -The e plo er ill ot re ei e a i for atio o the ti e e plo ees spe t o the i ter et.
Use of the i ter et for e plo ers :
As soo as stage starts, the e plo er a li k o the utto start Bro ser . A I ter et E plorer i do ope s auto ati all a d the e plo er a use the i ter et duri g the fi e i utes. After fi e i utes the i do loses auto ati all .
I porta t oti e for oth e ployer a d e ployee:
If ou re ei e the follo i g ar i g he starti g the "I ter et E plorer You ill o l eed to li k o the "Go to ho e page utto to start the Bro ser.
If ou ha e a uestio duri g the e peri e t, please raise our ha d. We ill a s er our uestio i pri ate. Please, a s er the follo i g o trol uestio s. Raise our ha d he ou o pleted the a s ers. The e peri e t ill e started after all su je ts a s ered the uestio s orre tl .
Before the a tual e peri e t starts ou ill see a h potheti al uestio o the s ree . Please, a s er this uestio . You ill ot re ei e a pa e t for this uestio a d it ill ot ha e a o se ue es for the su se ue t e peri e t. Ne ertheless, please a s er this uestio ho estl . After that, the a tual e peri e t starts.
Co trol uestio s
Please, i agi e the follo i g:
The e plo er allo ated a share W of % of the fir re e ue to the orkers. The e plo ees sol e tasks i total The follo i g rou ds o sist of t h e s t a g e s o u a l r e a d l e a r ed fro Part I of the e peri e t. Before rou ds -8 ill start, there is a o eti e ha ge o pared to Part I: A egotiatio o er the i trodu tio of a i i u wage ill take pla e.
A i i u wage ould guara tee the e plo ees a i i u share W i.e. the split the orkers re ei e jointly for rou ds -8. The e plo er ould e ou d to allo ate at least this i i u share a d ould ot offer a share lo er tha the i i u share.
I the egotiatio stage the e plo ees of a fir argai olle ti el ith their e plo er o er a i i u share.
Please ote: The egotiatio takes pla e o ly o e a d o ly efore rou d starts.
